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        Descartes’ Refutation of Atheism: A Defense

In the Meditations and Replies to objections, Descartes makes and defends some initially surprising claims about the epistemic condition of the atheist. According to Descartes, an atheist cannot be certain of anything, not even the truths of mathematics, and cannot attain certainty until he or she concedes that God exists and is not a deceiver. Indeed, not even in the case of propositions that are otherwise clear, distinct and grasped with intrinsic certainty is it possible for the atheist to possess indubitable knowledge.​[1]​ In response to an anonymous contributor to the Second Objections, who maintains that the claim that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is just as evident to and certain for an atheist as it is for a believer, Descartes responds with a stout denial of this assertion:​[2]​
	 The fact that an atheist can be ‘clearly aware that the three angles
	of a triangle are equal to two right angles’ is something that I do not dispute.
	But I maintain that this awareness of his is not true knowledge, since no act
            of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge. 
	Now since we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, he cannot be 
	certain that he is not being deceived on matters that seem to him very evident
	(as I fully explained). And although this doubt may not occur to him, it can	still crop up if someone else raises the point or if he looks into the matter 
	himself. So he will never be free of doubt until he acknowledges that God
	exists.​[3]​ 
In another spot, he makes the point in a different way, with regard to ordinary, empirical common-sense knowledge:
	An atheist can infer that he is awake on the basis of the memory of his 
past life. But he cannot know that his criterion is sufficient to give him the 
	certainty that he is not mistaken, if he does not know that he was created by
	a non-deceiving God.​[4]​
The atheist, it seems, cannot be certain of anything apart from belief in God, no matter how intrinsically certain what he or she believes may seem to him or her to be at the time.​[5]​
	In this context, Descartes considers one possible escape route for someone wishing to evade skepticism:
	Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of 
	so powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us 
            not argue with them, but grant them that everything said about God is a fiction.
	According to their supposition, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate
	or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since
	deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my 
	original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived 
	all the time. I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled
	to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may
	be properly raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but 
	is based on powerful and well thought-out reasons.​[6]​
Elsewhere, Descartes reiterates this argument:
	As for the kind of knowledge possessed by the atheist, it is easy to
	demonstrate that it is not immutable and certain. As I have stated 
	previously, the less power the atheist attributes to the author of his being, 
	the more reason he will have to suspect that his nature will be so imperfect 
	as to allow him to be deceived even in matters which seem utterly 
	evident to him. And he will never be able to be free of this doubt until he 
	recognizes that he has been created by a God who is not a deceiver.​[7]​
It is this argument against the atheist that will primarily concern us here.
	This consideration is intended to enforce the idea that the atheist has no justification for his or her belief that he or she possesses reliable cognitive faculties and thus no reason to believe that any of the beliefs produced by those faculties are true, regardless of how well grounded they appear to be, based on experience. Descartes does not claim that there is some phenomenological or experiential difference between the way in which believers and non-believers apprehend truths such as that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Presumably, the intrinsic certainty of the atheist’s clear and distinct perception of that truth is identical, in both quality and degree, to that of the theist. In the same way, both the theist and the atheist will appeal to experience in order to justify the claim that he or she is currently awake, so the difference between them cannot lie in the cogency of the appeal. Nevertheless, there is, according to Descartes, a profound difference in the epistemic condition of the atheist as opposed to that of the theist. Given the foregoing considerations, the atheist has no ground for supposing that he or she possesses reliable cognitive faculties, hence no ground for confidence in the deliverances of those faculties. As such, when the atheist employs his or her cognitive faculties, he or she has no reason to suppose that those faculties “track truth.” Given this, appeals to (e.g.) intrinsic certainty and experience are useless in this context since they could be completely illusory. Indeed, until the atheist can provide some sort of justification for the belief that he or she possesses reliable cognitive faculties, no deliverances of those faculties can be function for him or her either as justified beliefs or as properly basic beliefs. Nor do the problems for the atheist end here. Any attempt to use those faculties in order to provide such a justification will inevitably end by arguing in a circle, putting the possibility of providing such justification beyond the atheist’s reach.
	In just the same way as the rest of the atheist’s beliefs fall under a cloud in this context, so too does the atheist’s belief in atheism itself. Indeed, if the foregoing is correct, the atheist has no grounds for trusting his or her cognitive faculties; as such, an atheist can never have a good argument or reason for atheism any more than an atheist can have a good argument or reason for believing anything at all. Ironically, if atheism is true, no one can have a good reason for believing that atheism is true – and, of course, if atheism is false, there cannot be a good reason for supposing it to be true, as Descartes himself points out. It follows, then, that no one can ever have a good reason for thinking that atheism is true, regardless of whether or not it is true. Let us proceed to look into this in more detail. 
As I interpret this argument, the atheist is committed to the claim that his or her cognitive faculties are the product of the operation of non-rational natural processes that are at best accidentally related to the goal of “truth tracking.”​[8]​ Given this, I maintain that there is no reason whatsoever for supposing that those cognitive faculties are, in fact, capable of “tracking truth.” Inasmuch as these highly developed, finely-tuned cognitive mechanisms have arisen from the operation of processes naturally indisposed to produce them (so that they could arise only by accident), on the supposition that our cognitive faculties are the product of such processes it is highly unlikely that we would possess reliable cognitive faculties. This is because the intrinsic probability that such processes blindly and accidentally would produce truth-tracking cognitive faculties is, while incalculable, no doubt extremely low – inscrutably low.​[9]​ This, of course, will hold regardless of whether or not those faculties are reliable in fact, or even known to be so on the basis of some plausible argument.
On the ethics of belief to which atheists generally claim to subscribe, one must proportion one’s belief to the available evidence; to do otherwise is to violate our most fundamental doxastic obligations.​[10]​ Thus, to embrace a belief in the teeth of the evidence, contrary to what the evidence supports, would be willfully to embrace an irrational belief and thus to be irrational. As we have seen, however, the intrinsic probability that we possess reliable cognitive faculties is extremely low if atheism is true, thus contrary to the available evidence. Given, as I have just argued, that no other evidence is relevant to deciding the matter in this context, to suppose that we have reliable cognitive faculties in the current context would be to believe something against the preponderance of evidence, hence contrary to the epistemic obligations that proponents of scientism endorse and impose on theists at every opportunity. Thus, to suppose that atheism is true entails that we ought not to believe it to be so. Atheism thus proves to be epistemically self-undermining when considered as a substantive claim about the nature of things.​[11]​
Atheism and Rationality This entails some curious results concerning the relative positions of atheists and theists in the debate over God’s existence. Suppose that there is an apparently compelling argument for atheism – call it Argument A. If the Cartesian argument considered above is correct in what it implies, any successful argument for atheism, whatever it may be, would have the effect of completely undermining our confidence in our cognitive faculties. In consequence, it would also undermine Argument A itself, by undermining our confidence in our ability to use those cognitive faculties to evaluate its reasoning. After all, if atheism entails that not even 2+2=4 is certain for an atheist, then surely the same will hold for argument A. As such, even on the supposition that Argument A is a good argument, we can have no reason for supposing that we are in any position to know that this is the case, thus leaving us unable confidently to judge that Argument A actually is a good argument. On the other hand, suppose that we take ourselves to be in a position to evaluate argument A. In that case, we are taking for granted that we have reliable cognitive faculties. However, since we are not entitled to that supposition on the hypothesis that atheism is true, then either that assumption is false or Argument A is not, after all, a good argument – and this will hold regardless of whether or not our cognitive faculties are actually reliable. As such, even if it is actually the case that atheism is true, I possess reliable cognitive faculties, and Argument A is a completely successful proof of atheism, the Cartesian argument rules out, in principle, the possibility that I might reasonably affirm that atheism is true on its basis.  It is surely a great disadvantage to any position that there cannot be, even in principle, a successful argument for its truth even if it is true. However, for the reasons we have just seen, that seems to be the case where atheism is concerned.
	Indeed, we cannot even entertain the metaphysical possibility that atheism might be true without falling afoul of the Cartesian argument considered above. For if atheism is even so much as possible in such a way that it might be true in the actual world, then it is equally the case that it is possible that my cognitive faculties, being the product of directionless chance processes with no tendency to produce reliable faculties of this sort, are completely unreliable as a guide to theoretical truth. If so, we are in no position to employ those faculties in the investigation of that possibility with any hope of success. In that case, not merely the positive atheist, but also the negative atheist and the agnostic will be caught in the net of the Cartesian argument considered above. The negative atheist, who embraces unbelief on the mere failure of theistic proofs to establish the conclusion that God exists, surely supposes that he or she is capable of evaluating those arguments and arriving at the conclusion that they are all defective. If so, he or she must also assume the reliability of his or her cognitive faculties. However, on the supposition that atheism is true, or even that it is metaphysically possible, the negative atheist is in no position to make this assumption. As such, the negative atheist cannot have any rational confidence that he or she has arrived at a judicious evaluation of those arguments and thus that atheism is justified in his or her case. 
In a like manner, the agnostic suspends judgment on the question of whether God exists on the ground that, as far as he or she can see, the evidence for belief and unbelief are evenly balanced, so that to affirm either position is to exceed what the burden of reason will support. Once again, however, the agnostic supposes that he or she is in a position to judiciously weigh the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that no judgment concerning God’s existence is rationally justified. If so, the agnostic also supposes that his or her cognitive faculties are reliable, an assumption that, as we have seen, is problematic given the metaphysical possibility of atheism. Yet there can be no alternatives between which to suspend judgment unless we suppose that atheism is metaphysically possible, i.e. might actually be true. So, once again, either the agnostic is in a position to arrive at the preferred conclusion, which will be possible only on the supposition that atheism is false, or he is not, in which case the agnostic is barred from arriving at the preferred conclusion in the first place.
	Indeed, even to envisage the metaphysical possibility of atheism seems problematic if atheism is true.​[12]​ For I can only reasonably judge that atheism is metaphysically possible if it is possible for me to trust my cognitive faculties so far forth, and so far we have found no reason to exempt even this from Descartes’ blanket condemnation. Thus, if we can even so much as envisage the metaphysical possibility of atheism as an object of potential judgment, then we must suppose that our cognitive faculties are reliable so far forth, a supposition that we have seen to be inconsistent with the admission that atheism is metaphysically possible and thus not available to us in this context. As such, we are unable even to judge its metaphysical possibility. On the other hand, if we suppose that we are able to make that a rational judgment on this matter, then the only judgment we could rationally arrive at, in principle, is that atheism is not metaphysically possible, since only that judgment is consistent with our original assumption. In no case, then, can we even so much as envisage the metaphysical possibility of atheism, since the our doing so seems to require that atheism be false as a necessary condition for its very possibility. A view that entails these results is surely in serious difficulty.
A Pragmatic Response Now these results seem to be extremely odd, because it certainly does seem that I can envisage the metaphysical possibility of atheism as an object of judgment and of atheism and agnosticism as live options in the philosophy of religion. At the same time, it also seems to me to be case that my cognitive faculties, though far from perfect, are nevertheless reliable and capable of tracking truth. Of course, the fact that this is the way things seem to me to be does not entail that this is the way things are. My conviction on this point could be merely an illusion. Nor does there appear to be any way for me to justify the reliability of my cognitive faculties without arguing in a circle by using those very faculties to justify themselves – after all, it would appear that any such justification would require the use of the very faculties that I had called into question and thus would be circular.​[13]​
	At the same time, one could just as well argue that our inability to justify the reliability of our cognitive faculties also excludes the possibility that they might be shown, by some sort of argument or body of evidence, to be unreliable. Indeed, for this reason we need not fear the claims of some scientists, etc. to the effect that e.g. introspection or eyewitness testimony are generally or systematically unreliable. Any argument to this effect would epistemically refute itself, since it would undermine our access to the evidence intended to justify that belief.​[14]​ Whatever the pitfalls of relying on such faculties, their in principle reliability is not a matter open to empirical disconfirmation, on pain of destroying the very preconditions for the empirical evaluation of any hypothesis. In this context, the only importance of this observation is that, like claims about the afterlife, claims about the reliability of our cognitive faculties may be capable of empirical verification while their unreliability is not, even in principle.​[15]​ In that case, we need not fear that someone will come along and prove that “everything we know is wrong.”​[16]​
	This layer of epistemic insulation may encourage a pragmatic attitude toward reliance on our cognitive faculties. Since we are not going to be caught out on the matter, we risk nothing in simply affirming that the way things appear is the way they are in fact. Further, as Hume makes us all too well aware, we really have no choice in the matter. If we are to proceed at all, we have to suppose the reliability of our cognitive faculties, so we may as well do so up front and without apology. In that case, we should just follow the argument wherever it leads. If it leads to something (like atheism or determinism) which seems to undermine the reliability of our cognitive faculties, we must simply stick to our guns and affirm what we cannot otherwise do without even in the teeth of the evidence. After all, what else can we do? More than this, what more could we reasonably be expected to do? If the answer is “nothing,” then there seems nothing more that we can, hence nothing more that we should do. What, in this case, are we to be faulted for?
	Such a person takes the position that even though some of our substantive belief-commitments entail that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is low to inscrutable, that nevertheless we do nothing doxastically objectionable in affirming that our cognitive faculties are reliable despite that fact. I think that any sensible person can see at a glance what is objectionable about this. To help those who may not be able to see this for whatever reason, consider the following.
	Fred has been in the asylum for a long time, and has been continually dragooned by doctors and relatives who assure him that he is insane. Fred doesn’t believe this, however, and like many crazy people is completely convinced of his own sanity. In one of his relatively lucid moments, he reasons to himself as follows. I have no choice but to proceed on the assumption that I am sane. After all, what choice do I have? If I adopt the opposite assumption, then I am in no position even to consider the question of whether or not I am mad.​[17]​ Therefore, I will continue to assert that I sane and to resist all attempts to persuade me otherwise. This, it seems to him, is the only strategy at his disposal – as indeed it is.
	Fred’s desperate doctors, however, believe that his cure can only be affected by getting him to admit that he is insane and submitting to their treatment, which to this point he has resisted on the grounds that he is not mad. At last they hit upon an expedient that they think may persuade this most philosophical of lunatics. The get Fred to admit that there is a particular proposition P that only crazy people would believe, and then demonstrate to him that certain other beliefs that Fred espouses entail just this belief. Fred, it seems, has no choice but to admit that he is insane, given his own earlier admission. However, remembering his earlier “pragmatic” justification for his belief in his own sanity, Fred finds a happy reply to this response. “Well,” he says, “ordinarily, for a person to hold P would be sufficient proof of his insanity; however, since I know that I am not insane, I conclude that in my case, the fact that I hold P proves no such thing.” Defeated, Fred’s doctors go off to discuss further therapeutic options: antipsychotic drugs, electroshock, and so on… At this point, let us leave this story and return to our main point.
	What is objectionable in the foregoing pragmatic response it this. To adopt this policy in order to retain a favored belief would be an instance of the fallacy of special pleading, in which we refuse to admit in our own case the applicability of a rule that we would clearly impose on others and to which we would expect them to adhere. Ordinarily, that one’s philosophical position entails substantive commitments that would undermine the propriety of holding it from the rational point of view is sufficient reason for abandoning that philosophical position. To make arbitrary exceptions to this rule, or (like the Calvinist preacher) to look the contradiction in the eye and pass on, shrugging the difficulty off, passionately reasserting one’s commitment to the view, and so on, hardly seems like a rational response to this difficulty. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any philosophical view could ever be refuted if this sort of move were allowed. In the event that no other alternative was available, such behavior might excusable in the breach. However, that is not the case here. Descartes would say that theism is an obvious alternative deserving of our attention.
The Theistic Alternative By contrast, Cartesian theism possesses many advantages over atheism with regard to the issues we have been considering here. In the first place, if theism is true, then a perfect, omnipotent, benevolent, and veracious God created the universe.​[18]​ As Descartes argues, such a being could not be a deceiver. Given this, the probability is very high that we have reliable cognitive faculties. Thus, theism and belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties are not only barely consistent, they are in fact mutually reinforcing and there is no mystery about the reliability of our cognitive faculties given the truth of theism; in no way, then, is theism self-undermining on this score.	If Cartesian theism is true, we can rest assured that we have reliable cognitive faculties, hence that both theoretical inquiry and rational discourse are both possible and (as experience itself testifies) actual. Theism, then, provides a genuine foundation for the possibility of both philosophical and natural scientific research. The theist, then, has a good reason for supposing that his or her cognitive faculties are reliable and thus that the claims of well-confirmed natural science, etc. are actually true.
	Now it certainly appears to be the case that we have reliable cognitive faculties. As such, our everyday experience conforms to what we would expect to be the case if theism were true, and thus confirms theism so far forth. Of course, for all I have said here, this could be an illusion; like Fred, we might believe that we have reliable cognitive faculties even though we don’t. However, even if we don’t, as we have just seen we really have no choice but to assume that we do, since otherwise all rational discourse and theoretical inquiry come to an end. As such, we have ample pragmatic justification to assume whatever appears to be a transcendentally necessary for the possibility of our having reliable cognitive faculties and eschew any view that would undermine that belief.  However, since atheism (as we have seen) does undermine our belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties, we have good pragmatic reason to reject atheism as false; indeed, if we are even able to envisage the metaphysical possibility of atheism as an object of judgment, it must be the case that atheism is false, hence metaphysically impossible after all. Given this, we can be confident that there can never be a successful or rationally convincing argument for atheism, since the truth of the conclusion of that argument would prevent us from being able to trust the cognitive faculties used to construct and evaluate it. Peter Geach was right: when faced with an argument for atheism, the only question we need to ask is “Where is the fallacy hidden?” Atheistic arguments, then, should strike us as no more persuasive than arguments that there is no motion, or relations, or for the unreality of time, or fatalism, and their conclusion dismissed even though we may not be able to agree about where the flaw is to be found.
	For the same reason, since theism, the contradictory of atheism, does guarantee the reliability of our cognitive faculties in the manner shown by Descartes, we are pragmatically justified in affirming theism as a transcendentally necessary condition for reliable cognitive faculties, and thus for the possibility of even seriously considering the question whether God exists as a matter of theoretical inquiry. Indeed, if we can even discuss the matter at all, from the rational point of view, the answer to the question is evident from the first. From this point of view, we can no more reasonably doubt the existence of God than we can reasonably doubt our own sanity.
	Of course, it doesn’t follow from this that God actually exists, that atheism is actually false, or that we have reliable cognitive faculties. However, at this point, that hardly seems to matter. If what I have said is correct, there is no substantive question to be decided here. For the reasons I have given, there is simply no prospect at all that we shall be shown to be wrong if we believe, nor to think that atheism could be rationally vindicated, even in principle. Indeed, an atheist cannot even make sense of the truth of his or her own position from his or her own point of view. That does not mean that it cannot be made sense of; it certainly can, for example, from the theistic point of view. However, from that point of view we can only envisage it as false.
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^1	  For the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic certainty, which I claim is operative in Descartes though not drawn specifically by him, see Duncan (2008) 50-3.
^2	  See CSM, Vol. II, 89.
^3	  See CSM, Vol. II, 101.
^4	  See CSM, Vol. II, 137, the final Reply to the last of Hobbes’s Third Objections.
^5	  It is to be noted that Descartes mitigates this claim by insisting that his comments apply only to the case where someone has forgotten the proof for the claim – see, e.g., CSM, Vol. I, 197, CSM, Vol. II, 100, and CSMK, 334 (Conversation with Burman). I regard this as a false step, but will not go into the matter here. In what follows I will ignore this complication; may Descartes scholars forgive me.
^6	  See CSM, Vol. II, 14-15. This passage is from the First Meditation.
^7	  See CSM, Vol. II, 289, from the Replies to the Sixth Objections.
^8	  I have discussed evolutionary attempts to account for our reliable cognitive faculties elsewhere, and concluded that there is no reason to suppose that evolution would produce such faculties, even if it could do so fortuitously and accidentally – see my Reason and Illusion, Chapter  IX (unpublished.)  Evolution, then, is just one more such process and so falls under the aegis of this argument.
^9	  To borrow an image from Sharon Street, the probability here is about as great as the chances that a boat launched without any direction from Los Angeles would be carried by the mere action of the sea currents to a particular destination, such as Lisbon. See Street (2006) 12-13. (Pagination here refers to the online version of this article, subsequently published in Philosophical Studies.)
^10	  This, of course, is the ethics of belief as formulated by W. K. Clifford, often used to convict the theist of epistemic impropriety amounting to willful irrationality; see Clifford (1999) 70-96; originally published in 1877. Double, for one, speaks about how inspiring he found Clifford’s essay despite the fact that its argumentative content is weak; see his (1996) 54.
^11	  Here the shoe is on the other foot, though I would be frankly surprised if atheists were to follow through on their principles in this matter. Their failure to do so, however, surely calls into question their claims to valuing reason above all, their willingness to follow the argument wherever it leads, their being prepared to accept unpalatable conclusions, etc. which they regard as the hallmark of their intellectual fearlessness. See, e.g. Double (1996) 53-5.
^12	  For the notion of metaphysical possibility, see Duncan (2008) Chapter 2 and my essay “Compendium Metaphysicae” also published on PhilPapers.
^13	  Actually, I believe that there is a way to do this and it is precisely the way that Descartes does it in the Meditations – see Duncan (2008) passim. However, since Descartes’ strategy requires God as a crucial component, this provides no help to the atheist’s cause. In what follows, however, I will here assume the above point for the sake of the argument and thus forego reliance on what I have argued elsewhere.
^14	  As I hope to argue in “Could Introspection be Unreliable?” in preparation.
^15	  As Hick points out in his discussion of eschatological verification in Hick (1966) 169-99, there could be positive evidence for the afterlife consisting in post-mortem experience, whereas neither the afterlife nor its denial is capable of empirical falsification of any sort.
^16	  This is name of an old Firesign Theatre album released in 1974; of course, since you can’t be wrong about what you know, the album should have been called “Everything you think you know is wrong.”
^17	  For further discussion of this predicament, see my “Descartes and the Crazy Argument,” also posted to PhilPapers.
^18	  Some philosophers have challenged this idea along the following lines – see the unpublished essay by Plantinga I have identified as Plantinga (1994), which has no pagination and incomplete references. According to these philosophers, a view like Cartesian theism only appears to provide a high prior probability for the truth of the claim that we possess cognitive faculties capable of arriving at substantive theoretical truth. This is because Cartesian theism entails austere theism, according to which God is merely the creator/designer of the universe and lacks the moral predicates normally attributed to Him. According to  this view, we have no reason to suppose that we have cognitive faculties of the sort we described above and thus theism can at best claim mere parity with atheism. However, I have argued elsewhere that austere theism, properly understood, entails Cartesian theism, so this point is moot – see Duncan (2008), chapter 7. At any rate, the point is frivolous. If it is true that all triangles have three sides, then it is also true that all triangles have at least one side, since the former entails the latter. We could call the view that all triangles have at least one side “austere triangularianism,” then argue that, since we cannot prove that the interior angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees from austere triangularianism alone, that this claim must be false or somehow doubtful. That is obviously absurd. On what lies at the root of this failed parity argument, see Plantinga (1994), toward the end. 
